The political statement refers to the autonomy of regulation and decision-making of each bloc and its ability to make equivalency decisions in its own interest. From a British point of view, the latter reference to autonomy is less welcome when it comes to achieving considerable market access in equivalence. If one does not read about the objective of going beyond WTO obligations, there is no explicit reference to an extension of equivalence beyond the existing patch work. In this context, Steven Maijoor, President of the European Financial Markets Authority (ESMA), has already called for a comprehensive and harmonised European regime for trading platforms in third countries. The policy statement also refers to the fact that both parties begin to assess equivalence to each other as soon as possible after the withdrawal, so that they can be completed before the end of the second quarter of 2020. In order to allay the UNITED Kingdom`s concerns about the sudden withdrawal of equivalence, the documents promise “transparency and appropriate consultation in the process of accepting, suspending and withdrawing equivalency decisions.” We can also expect “close and structured cooperation” in regulation and oversight, as well as information exchange and consultation on regulatory initiatives of common interest, both at the political and technical level. It is likely that, in some areas, the ACF may still contribute in one way or another to the European supervisory authorities and their development of post-Brexit policy. Immediately after the announcement of a revised withdrawal agreement on October 17, 2019, Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the DUP said they could not support the new agreement. [30] Neither the agreement nor the political statement refers to the future relationship in law selection, judicial decision, recognition and enforcement of judgments. The UK has already hinted that it hopes to agree on a large-scale agreement, broadly in line with the current position. The withdrawal agreement provides for a transitional period until 31 December 2020, during which time the UK will remain in the internal market, to ensure the smooth flow of trade until a long-term relationship is concluded. If no agreement is reached by then, the UK will leave the single market without a trade deal on 1 January 2021. The withdrawal agreement is closely linked to a non-binding political declaration on future relations between the EU and the UK.

After the WAB becomes law, the withdrawal agreement must also be ratified by the European Parliament. The agreement was revised as part of the Johnson Department renegotiation in 2019. October 17, 2019, the UK and the EU have approved a revised agreement on the withdrawal of the UK from Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, approved by the Heads of State and Government at an extraordinary meeting of the European Council, a legally binding document containing provisions on the EU-UK “divorce regime” and on transitional agreements ( If , at the end of the transition period, the EU and the UNITED Kingdom fail to reach an agreement on their future relations guaranteeing the absence of a border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, the “backstop of Northern Ireland” will enter into force. In this case, Northern Ireland will be part of the UK customs territory, but it will be aligned with a limited set of EU rules, particularly with regard to goods. Trade in goods is affected. There will be regulatory controls on goods taking place at the UK`s entry into Northern Ireland and not through the land border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In addition, the United Kingdom will apply tariffs to the United Kingdom on products from third countries as long as goods imported with Deminland are threatened with entering the EU internal market.